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I've spoken of the shining city all my political life, but I
don't know if I ever quite communicated what I saw when I
said it. But in my mind it was a tall, proud city built on
rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-blessed, and
teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and
piece, a city with free ports that hummer with commerce
and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls
had doors and the doors were open to anyone with the will
and heart to get here. That's how I saw it and see it still. 1
Former president Ronald Reagan's vision of America as this shining
city ended Thursday, August 23, 1996, when President Bill Clinton
signed his name to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 2 considered the most far-
reaching welfare reform package in history. Although the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the federal government will save
over $57 billion between fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year 2002, this
welfare reform package profoundly impacts immigrants, particularly legal
immigrants. 3  Overall 44% of federal savings (approximately $23.8
billion) stems from denying public assistance benefits to legal
immigrants.
4
This new welfare legislation directly conflicts with United States
immigration policies. The federal government's need to cut costs, the
politicians' finding immigrants as an easy target on whom to place the
burden of cutting costs, as well as the desire to deter unwanted
immigrants will ultimately undermine this country's ability to remain
effectively competitive in the international market for valuable
1 President Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 11, 1989).
2 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), (Hereinafter PRWOA).
3 Impact of Immigration Provisions of Welfare Reform, Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, Feb. 5, 1997 <http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/welfare/impact.htm>.
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immigrants. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the effects of the Act
and the impacts upon both immigrants and non-immigrants. In order to
assess the far-reaching implications of the immigration provisions on
America's future, the motivation behind these changes must be explored.
Primarily, this paper focuses upon the differential treatment that
PRWORA affords to citizens versus non-citizens as well as the long-term
effects on U.S. immigration policies.
I. Effects of the Act on Non-Immigrant Citizens
PRWORA mandates that block grants will be appropriated to the
states to implement Temporary Assistance for Families with Needy
Children (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Food Stamps.
These funds total $82.8 billion over the next five years. 5 The Act also
describes three new areas of restriction to aid: work requirements, family
make up requirements, and prohibited behavior restrictions.
A. The Work Requirement
Under the new reform package, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), a capped block grant for states, replaced Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (individual entitlements).6
TANF requires that a parent or caretaker who receives this assistance be
engaged in work within two years of receiving aid.7 Enforcement of this
provision is the state's responsibility. In fact, states' receipt of funds is
dependent on the percentage of aid recipients who are working in a given
year.8 Recipients face penalties for refusing to work, including reduction
in amount of aid provided or even termination of benefits. 9 The language
of the Act is mandatory. If the work requirement is not met, the state shall
implement one of these penalties. 10 Parallel requirements apply to Food
Stamps, with similar deadlines and penalties."
B. The Family Make up Requirements for Eligibility
This aid is for families with minor children. PRWORA specifically
defines "family" to accommodate instances of divorce and custody
arrangements, and to eliminate abuses, such as having more children to
increase one's amount of aid.
5 Ann Morse, Welfare Reform is the Law - Now What?, Immigrant Policy Project, Aug.
22, 1996 <http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/s1 9611 .htm#nowwhat>.6 d.
7 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402(a)(1)(A)(ii), 110 Stat. at 2113.8 ld. at § 407(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2129.
9 1d. at § 407(e)(1)(A), (B), 110 Stat. at 2133.
10 Id.
11 d. at § 815, 110 Stat. at 2315.
First, the definition of a "family" eligible under this section includes a
minor child living with a custodial parent or caretaker relative, or a
pregnant woman. 12 A state must deny assistance to any family that has
been receiving federal aid for five years unless they are covered under an
exception which allows children to receive, among other things,
emergency aid and medical treatment. 13 Furthermore, if individuals
receiving aid are not working within two years, they will be penalized.
Possible penalties include reduced aid, or termination of benefits. 14 No
additional aid will be granted to families for children born after they have
begun receiving aid.
15
There will be no assistance for teenage parents who are not attending
high school or equivalency training, 16 or who are not living in adult
supervised settings. 17 Minors who run way from home, or are absent from
home for a significant period, are ineligible to receive any aid.18 In
addition, families must assign certain support rights to the state.' 9 For
example, the state may acquire the right to pursue child support on behalf
of a family receiving aid under this section.20 Because of a new emphasis
on child support obligations, families must participate in establishing
paternity, 2 1 and states must form a plan to establish paternity and to
enforce child support obligations. 22 The Food Stamps program has been
amended to add the possibility of denying food stamps to those who are
obligated by law, court order or other mechanism to support a minor and
refuse to do so.2
3
C. Prohibited Behavior Restrictions to Aid
Certain individuals are barred from receiving aid because of their past
behavior. It was a concern that if states had separate welfare rolls, food
stamp rolls and SSI eligible lists, individuals would seek to defraud the
system by attempting to qualify in more than one state and in effect,
receive double aid. To combat this, a person who has fraudulently
represented residence in order to gain this double aid is barred from
receiving any aid for ten years. 24 The same is true for both SS125 and food
12
Id. at § 408(a)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at 2134.13 1d. at § 408(a)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 2134-35.14 [d.
15 [d.
16 1d. at § 408(a)(4), 110 Stat. at 2135-36.
17
Id. at § 408(a)(5), 110 Stat. at 2136.
18 Id. at § 408(a)(10)(A), 110 Stat. at 2139.
19 Id. at § 408(a), 110 Stat. at 2135.
20 [d.
211d. at § 301, 110 Stat. at 2199.
22 Supra, note 20.23 Id. at § 823, 110 Stat. at 2322.24 Id. at § 401(a), 110 Stat. at 2261.
stamps.26 Similarly, if fugitive felons or parole violators attempt to get
onto welfare rolls or qualify for SS127 or Food Stamps, 28 they will not
only be denied assistance, 29 but because cooperation with local law
enforcement is mandated in the Act, there is a better chance of
apprehending such individuals.
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II. Effects on Legal Immigrants
The provisions specifically affecting legal immigrants are fewer than
those affecting non-immigrant citizens, as listed above, but the immigrant
provisions are more sweeping as discussed below. In fact, one
commentator thinks that these changes will "redefine the status of legal
aliens in our society." 31 When benefits are denied, needy immigrants will
necessarily rely on private aid, or suffer deprivation of the barest
necessities, hunger or homelessness. Such circumstances may, in turn,
cause some to turn to panhandling, squatting or even crime. This
additional negative exposure could easily turn public opinion against
immigrants even further so that as a whole, their status in society will be
redefined at a lower echelon.
A. Changes to Eligibility for Federal Aid
Legal immigrants are part of a group that is termed "qualified aliens"
under PRWORA. This group includes those granted asylum, refugees and
other immigrants who are defined by other statutory provisions.32 Section
401 states that non-qualified aliens, those not included in the statutory
definition as just listed, are ineligible for all federal aid except certain
emergent and short-term disaster care, immunizations, housing programs,
various aid programs for children, and other aid, such as soup kitchens.
33
Section 402 applies to qualified aliens denying them eligibility for federal
aid as well. The language is clear that qualified aliens shall "not [be]
eligible for any specific Federal Program." 34 However, there are
exceptions to this broad denial, as well as a transition provision.
251Id. at § 201, 110 Stat. 2185.26 Id. at § 820, 110 Stat. at 2321.
2 7 Id. at § 202, 110 Stat. at 2185.2 1ld. at § 821, 110 Stat. at 2321.291d. at § 408(a)(9), 110 Stat. at 2139.
3 0 d.
31 Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmerman, When Should Immigrants Receive Public
Benefits? The Urban Institute (visited Feb. 9, 1997)
<https://www.urban.org/welfare/chap 15.htm>.
32 Supra, note 7 at § 43 1(b), 110 Stat. at 2274.33 Id. at § 401(b), 110 Stat. at 2261.34 Id. at § 402(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2264; "Specific federal programs" is defined in
paragraph three of this section as supplemental security income (SSI) under the Social
Security Act, and Food Stamps.
The general prohibition on federal aid does not apply to immigrants
who have been admitted into the United States legally, and who have
worked ten years in this country without receiving any aid or assistance
during that time. 35 Nor does this section apply to veterans or those on
active duty in the military, their spouses or children.36 These exceptions
seem to ring hollow since the groups described in this section are unlikely
to require any aid. There is a transition portion included in the general
prohibition which requires redetermination of eligibility for SSI and Food
Stamps. A redetermination must be performed within one year of the
welfare reform enactment to insure that only those qualified under the
new Act will continue to receive benefits.37 The time period before
redetermination is not a specific amount of time for any individual
currently receiving aid, but nonetheless is termed a transition period.
In addition to the general prohibition above, Section 402 gives states
the authority to deny TANF aid and Medicaid under the social services
block grant and Medicaid.38 As previously stated, states can apply their
own rules of eligibility to state services and some federal programs as
long as the eligibility rules are stricter than the Act.39 More than half of
the states will provide continued assistance to current immigrants
(resident non-citizens as of August 23, 1996) whereas four states,
Alabama, Kentucky, South Carolina and Wyoming, plan to suspend
TANF funds.40 Of the majority states, Maryland, Nebraska, Utah and
Vermont will also provide assistance to new immigrants. 41 In cases where
a legal immigrant was receiving assistance under any of these programs,
and the state chose to deny eligibility, a safety net allowed the legal
42immigrants to continue to receive these benefits until January 1, 1997.
Whereas immigration information was once held confidential by
certain organizations, PRWORA requires reporting to the government
under Title IV of the Social Security Act.43 Thus, agencies administering
TANF, SSI or housing assistance are required to report regularly to the
35 Id. at § 402(a)(2)(B), 110 Stat. 2262.36 Id. at § 402(a)(2)(C), 110 Stat. at 2262.
37 Id. at § 402(a)(2)(D), 110 Stat. at 2262-63.38 Id. at § 402(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 2264.39 Id. at § 402(b)(2)(D), 110 Stat. at 2265.
40 Welfare Immigration Provisions Side by Side, Immigrant Policy Project at the Nat'l
Conference of State Legislatures, Aug. 1995, revised Sept. 17, 1996 (visited Feb. 9,
1997) <http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/welf-web.html>.
411d.; See Summary of INS/White House Materials Issued Aug./Sept. 1996, Immigrant
Policy Project at the Nat'1 Conference of State Legislatures, revised Sept. 19, 1996
(visited Feb. 9, 1997) <http://www.ncsi.org/statefed/welfare/insdocs.htm>; See also,
Alien Eligibility for Access to Public Benefits, INS Fact Sheet, Oct. 10, 1996
<http://www.usdoj.gov/ins/hqopp/welfare/factsfin.htm>.
42 Supra, note 5; see INS Fact Sheet, supra note 41.43 Supra note 40; see INS Fact Sheet, supra note 41.
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) the names and
addresses of known illegal immigrants. Furthermore, INS must issue
regulations within eighteen months for verifying that applicants are
qualified immigrants and eligible for public benefits. 44 In addition, states
must comply with this verification system and cannot withhold
information to the INS regarding the immigration status of an immigrant
in the U.S.
B. Changes Dealing with Sponsors and Affidavits of Support
Under the Immigration and Nationalization Act, all immigrants who
are allowed to enter this country must have a sponsor who signs an
affidavit of support for the immigrant.45 In the past, this has served as a
largely symbolic promise by the sponsor to support the immigrant. The
income of the sponsor was deemed to be income of the immigrant when
applications for aid were considered. If the sponsor did not follow
through with the promises included in the affidavit, there was no
recourse; the affidavits were not enforceable. The Act significantly
changes this area.
The income and resources of sponsors (and their spouses) who
execute affidavits of support shall be considered available to those
immigrants in determining program eligibility.46 This availability
continues until either the immigrant attains citizenship or works forty
qualifying quarters (i.e. ten years) in the U.S. Furthermore, qualifying
requires that the immigrant must not receive any federal means-tested
public assistance during those quarters. 47 Federal regulations for quarter
verification are pending. However, states have the option to deem income
and resources of sponsors for their own public assistance programs. In
addition, the Act makes the affidavit an enforceable contract that may be
enforced in any court, state or federal.48 This section also authorizes states
to implement the same rules to its programs.
49
Prior to this Act, legal immigrants were treated much like natural-born
citizens by the federal government. They paid taxes, were allowed to
serve in the armed forces, and could even be drafted. Federal aid in the
form of welfare was also available to them, just as to citizens. But the
passage of the Act marked a bright distinction in these two groups in the
area of federal aid. Legal immigrants still pay taxes, may serve in the
44 [d.
45 Supra, note 5 (discussing PRWORA).
46 Supra note 7 at § 42 1(b), 110 Stat 2270; see also supra, note 5 (discussing PRWORA).47 Supra note 40 (discussing PRWORA).
48 Supra, note 7 at § 423(a), 110 Stat. at 2271-72.
4 9 Id. at § 422, 110 Stat. at 2271.
armed forces and can be drafted, but their eligibility for federal aid has
been generally denied.
Section 400 of Title IV of the Act sets out a national policy with
regard to immigrants. 50 It states in two places that public benefits should
not be an incentive for individuals to want to enter the United States.
51
This section outlines the policy towards immigrants which was already in
place prior to PRWORA being signed into law. The references in this
section state that aliens have been applying for and receiving public
benefits at higher rates 52 and that current rules for eligibility as well as
unenforceable immigrants' sponsorship agreements have proved
ineffective in keeping immigrants from requiring federal aid.53 Finally,
the Act indicates that the United States has a compelling interest in
changing the problems with eligibility and sponsorship contracts so that
immigrants be self-reliant. 54 But these policy justifications should be
taken at face value in light of the political picture surrounding this issue.
Some may even say the reasons given by politicians are "disingenuous."
55
These policy justifications will be explored in an attempt to determine
why the Act contains such differential treatment for these two groups.
C. New Obligations Brought About by Act
This significant restructuring of the welfare system does not come
without cost. Ultimately, these costs are based upon the continuum of
responsibility for public assistance as shared by federal, state and local
governments as well as nonprofit organizations. Shifting the burden as
enumerated in the immigrant provisions within this Act will seriously
disadvantage immigrants, particularly legal immigrants. The most
significant obligation incurred under the Act is the shifting of public
assistance costs from the federal government to the states and other
entities. According to INS, there were an estimated 10.525 million legal
permanent residents or immigrants in the United States as of April
561996. Approximately 5.776 million were eligible to apply for U.S.
citizenship. 57 A disproportionate number of all U.S. legal residents live in
'°Id. at § 400, 110 Stat. at 2260.
"1Id. at § 400(2)(b)(6), 110 Stat. at 2260.
521d. at § 400(3), 110 Stat. at 2260.531d. at § 400(4), 110 Stat. at 2260.541d. at § 400(5), 100 Stat. at 2260.
55 Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the Issues, The Urban Institute (Isabel V. Sawhill ed.)
<http://www.urban.org/welfare/overview.htm>.
56 INS State Estimates on Naturalization Eligibility, Nov. 20, 1996 (last modified Nov.
27, 1996) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ins/hqopp/welfare/lprest.html> (describing is a margin
of error of +/- 350,000 in the calculation of legal residents and +/- 325,000 for those
eligible for citizenship).57 Id.
California and New York respectively.58 Other leading states of residence
are Texas, Florida, New Jersey, Illinois and Massachusetts .59 Three out of
every four immigrants live in these seven states.6" Therefore, these states
will bear a disproportionately large strain on their respective budgets and
resources.
According to the UCLA Center for Health Policy Research,
approximately 830,000 immigrants in California will lose government-
funded health insurance. 61 Ninety-two thousand elderly immigrants on
Medi-Cal, the California state-funded health insurance, are expected to
lose medical coverage once the provisions of the welfare bill take effect.
62
Suspension of federal health care benefits forces states to scramble for
additional funds to compensate and provide for basic medical care for its
residents. Loss of benefits also imposes a financial hardship on hospitals
which suffer big losses without payment from Medicaid, or state
equivalents of the Medicaid program. 63 There is the added problem of
numerous people going without preventive health care. This translates
into increases in communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, greater
problems for U.S. citizen babies born to immigrant mothers, and greater
strain on emergency rooms.64 In addition, community resources, such as
food banks, and other nonprofit community groups will shoulder the
burden. The National Immigration Forum (NIF) estimates that $20 billion
in costs for public benefits to immigrants will shift from the federal level
to state and local providers over the next five years.
65
III. WHY LEGAL IMMIGRANTS ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM CITIZENS IN THE
WELFARE REFORM ACT
In exploring the rationale behind the distinction between natural-born
citizens and non-citizens, or "qualified citizens," as established in the Act,
it is necessary to examine the underlying objectives of welfare which,
according to PRWORA has motivated this recent, insistent push for
58 Id. at Table 1. (As of April 1996, 35% of all legal immigrants reside in California;
14% in New York, 8% in both Texas and Florida, 4% in New Jersey and Illinois, and 3%
in Massachusetts. These state estimates are based on information collected in the 1990
Census by the U.S. Census Bureau and on immigration and naturalization data collected
by INS.).59
Id.
60 ld.
61 Bert Eljera, Poisons Pill: Proposed welfare bill denies benefits to non-citizens, Asian
Week, Aug. 2, 1996 <http://www.asianweek.com/080296/PoisonPill080296.html>.
62 Id.
63 Robert A. Rosenblatt, Budget Would Restore Some Immigrant Aid, L.A. Times, Feb. 7,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2180112.
64 Supra, note 61.
65 Brendan Maturen, The U.S. and Them: Cutting Federal Benefits to Legal Immigrants,
48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 338-39 (Summer 1995).
welfare reform. These motivations include personal responsibility, deficit
reduction, and public appeal (i.e., political gain). Careful scrutiny of each
individual motivating factor will facilitate a clearer understanding as to
how immigrants, specifically legal entrants, have been singled out under
the welfare reform provisions.
A. Personal Responsibility as Motivation for Welfare Reform
Many argue that the motivation for welfare reform is to change the
system and what it represents, rather than totally eliminate it, in order to
assist those in need without fostering dependence and to promote
personal responsibility in general. This being true, there now seems to be
different standards for citizens and non-citizens that previously had not
been in place. For citizens on welfare, the wish is to wean them off of any
aid dependency, rendering them completely self-sufficient without need
for assistance and in a position to positively affect society. For those not
currently on welfare, the goal of welfare is to serve as a safety net for
Americans who fall on hard times and may need temporary assistance to
get back on their feet.
However, this attitude of Christian charity combined with self-
reliance does not necessarily extend to non-citizens. There are three
categories of immigrants to consider in determining whether PRWORA
similarly fosters the goals of self-sufficiency and personal responsibility
for these non-citizens. First, there are those who do not qualify for the
exceptions under this Act. These immigrants had until January 1, 1997, or
until they were "redetermined," or reassessed before they were cut off
from aid.66 A second category of immigrants are those who fall under the
exception because arguably, they are self-reliant and will not become
dependent on federal aid programs. Finally, those who enter the country
legally and would otherwise be deemed "qualified aliens," are ineligible
for any aid, if at all, for five years.
The Act contains a provision which takes into account sponsors'
earnings in determining eligibility.67 This provision essentially works as a
general ban on government assistance for most legal immigrants. On its
face, these provisions seem to require greater self-reliance and faster
results of our immigrants already residing in this country. As for newly
arriving immigrants, self-sufficiency is a prerequisite, not a future
requirement. The underlying policy of the immigrant provisions of
PRWORA is to remove aid as an incentive for those wishing to come to
the U.S. Implementing these provisions will certainly effectuate this goal.
It is clear that immigrants are held to a higher standard of personal
responsibility. This may be justified. If we ask citizens to make a sacrifice
66 Supra note 5.
61 Supra note 5.
or to face risks for the national collective good, then should not
immigrants contribute at least as much, if not more, in order to reap the
benefits of residing in this country? Yet, immigrants bear many of the
same burdens as citizens, such as paying taxes.
The only critical difference is where they, as immigrants, were born.
Or is it? The difficulty in answering these questions demonstrates the
inadequacy of this particular objective in singularly providing a logical
explanation for the discriminatory treatment of immigrants under
PRWORA. So it is necessary to look to other motivating factors.
B. Deficit Reduction as Motivation for Welfare Reform
If deficit reduction is the sole motivation for welfare reform, then this
objective provides a clear reason for the distinction between treatment of
citizens and non-citizens under the Act. The immigrant provisions will
cut approximately half a million immigrants from the rolls of SSI, saving
$283 billion a year.68 Reducing eligibility of immigrants for food stamps
will save $600 million per year in the first year.69 These are large
numbers and although these are ballpark figures, the impact is obvious.70
After signing the Act, President Clinton voiced his concerns about the
provisions, stating that "[t]his provision has nothing to do with welfare
reform. It is simply a budgetary saving measure .. ."71 But in this day
and age of deficit reducing sentiment, how can those numbers not be
appealing enough to rationalize? The action suggests that aliens are easy
victims in furtherance of this ulterior motive and more importantly, a
reason why PRWORA treats immigrants so differently than they have
been treated in the past. But are the figures alone sufficient to motivate
Congress to make these changes? It is possible that there were additional
reasons contributing to Congressional approval of this legislation, as
discussed below.
C. Public Opinion (Political Gain) as Motivation for Welfare Reform
Congress would not have made these harsh changes regarding
immigrants, if the public had not allowed it to happen. Most Americans
have seen television news shows featuring stories of persons abusing
welfare. Certainly as memorable are other news stories of the rising
number of aliens crossing the into the U.S. illegally and the futility of
68 Federal Cost Estimate for Welfare and Medicaid Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193 at
1941 (1996) reprinted in U.S.S.C.A.N. 2253, 2580.
69 [d.
70 Id. (Due to administrative record keeping, which includes citizenship inquiries on
applications that may be outdated or inaccurate because of time, the figures in this report,
which were based on administrative records are not exact.).
71 Bill Clinton, Presidential News Conference, July 31, 1996, reprinted in The
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review, 2216, 2217 (1996).
INS efforts to stop it. True, these are illegal immigrants. But the public
does not really make a distinction among non-citizens.
California recently passed Proposition 187 which denies benefits to all
aliens, including public education and emergency medical care. 72 Given
that California is traditionally considered to be liberal regarding social
policy, this could be seen as what led the way for the Congressional
enactment. Since Californians did not mind this drastic measure,
Washington could have embraced the opportunity to follow suit, saving
billions of dollars along the way.
Evidence of increasing anti-immigrant sentiment is the national
movement to establish English as the official national language. Some
groups are blaming immigrants for taking jobs from Americans or
labeling immigrants as the source of economic problems. Public opinion
has been embracing such anti-immigrant sentiment. Politicians were
constantly polling, keenly aware of public opinion and its impact on an
election year. Feeling the pressure to produce, Congress rode the wave of
negative public sentiment towards immigrants. Public sentiment
demanding welfare reform merged with public anti-immigrant sentiment.
D. Reconciling Welfare Reform with Immigration Policies
However, in spite of growing anti-immigrant sentiment and numerous
stringent immigration laws, millions continue to emigrate to the United
States. "In 1992, the U.S. accepted 700,000 newcomers. In fact,
immigration generates 39% of the total population in this country ... In
1971-91, 35.2% of legal immigrants came from Asia, 23.7% from
Mexico alone, 13.1% from Caribbean countries, 12.0% from Europe and
11.1% from Central and South America."73 Of those legal permanent
residents who entered this country, 75% entered on family-based
admissions. 74 While immigrants may use welfare more than non-
immigrants, the difference is not profoundly significant. "The 1990
Census reveals that 4.7% of immigrants receive[d] welfare (cash transfers
defined as AFDC, SSI or state general assistance) versus 4.2% of [non-
immigrants]."75 Furthermore, approximately 11 million immigrants work,
earning at least $240 billion annually and paying more than $90 billion in
taxes. 76 That's a lot more than the estimated $5 billion immigrants receive
on welfare.77 There seems to be a lot of ignorance about the contributions
72 CA Prop. 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West).
73 Stanislav Kelman, "New People ": Influence of Immigration on American Economy,
Apr. 18, 1993 <http://www.cbu.edu/-skelman/Immigration.html>.
74 Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, Perspective on Immigration: Who's on the Dole?
It's Not Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1994, at B7.
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76 Supra, note 73.77 Supra, note 65.
that legal immigrants make to American. In addition to contributing more
in taxes than received in welfare benefits, they may "creatfe] jobs through
entrepreneurial activity, produc[e] income equal to their share of the
population, and [are] self-employed at a higher rate than citizens." 78 In
fact, 7.2% of immigrants are self-employed, compared to 7% of natural-
born citizens.
79
Although the overall motivation behind welfare reform is to reduce
federal spending, the motivation behind suspending welfare benefits to
immigrants seems to be to deter unwanted immigrants -- those expected
to live off of public assistance. However, manipulating public assistance
benefits is not the most effective way to effect immigration policies.
While reducing immigration levels may result in an increase in immigrant
quality, screening policies are a more effective means of attracting
valuable immigrants and thereby remaining competitive in the
international market for migrants.
81
The key lies in an admissions policy which selects on the basis of
skills. Economic immigrants, including skilled workers, business
immigrants and their dependents, constituted approximately 35% of
Canada's total entrants during the 1980s whereas employment-preference
immigrants constituted 5.7% , or 388,476 of total U.S. entrants from
82 imgainaebsdo1985-1991. Instead, U.S. immigration policies are strongly based on
family reunification principles. From 1985-1991, approximately 2.9
million immigrants were admitted under family reunification programs of
the total 6.5 million entrants as compared to the remaining 3 million or so
who were admitted as refugees or asylees.
83
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper does not suggest that the United States abandon its pro-
family commitments. Rather, part of the solution may lie in a more
balanced admissions approach: allowing for more immigrants who can
contribute to the economy so that the numbers more closely resemble
those admitted under family preferences. Another part of the solution is to
clearly distinguish legal aliens from illegal aliens. While there is the need
for generous immigration policies for legal entrants, there is a parallel
78 Supra, note 74.79 Supra, note 68.8 0 F.H. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies, 16 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 81 (1996).81 Id. at 90.
82 Id. at 94.83 Id. at 92-93.
need to counter illegal immigration. 84 A number of politicians and policy
makers are demanding "tougher border enforcement, quicker deportation
of criminal aliens, harsher penalties for persons over staying their visas, a
streamlined Immigration and Naturalization Service bureaucracy and
market-oriented solutions."
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Yet, the impact of the recent welfare reform legislation, PRWORA, is
most acutely felt by legal immigrants. Since signing the welfare bill into
law, President Clinton has promised to alleviate the undue burdens that
the welfare bill places on legal immigrants. In his State of the Union
address, President Clinton asserted,
We passed welfare reform. All of you know I believe we
were right to do it. But no one can walk out of this chamber
with a clear conscience unless you are prepared to finish
the job. And we must join together to do something else,
too, something both Republican and Democratic governors
have asked us to do: to restore basic health and disability
benefits when misfortune strikes immigrants who came to
this country legally, who work hard, pay taxes, and obey
the law. To do otherwise is simply unworthy of a great
nation of immigrants.
86
Consequently, President Clinton's fiscal 1998 budget plan provides for
an estimated 350,000 of 500,000 immigrants whose eligibility is slated to
expire in August and September, to continue on the benefit rolls.
87
Clinton's budget sets aside $9.7 billion to restore those benefits.88 Thus,
disabled legal immigrants -- both adult and children -- would be restored
to SSI eligibility. Clinton's proposal faces a Republican-controlled
Congress opposed to changing the law. Rep. E. Clay Shaw, Jr. (R-Fla.), a
leading architect of the welfare legislation, discussed congressional
consideration of a block grant or other special funding to assist states
heavily impacted.89
The U.S. government has a moral and social obligation to extend
assistance when its citizens and legal permanent residents fall on hard
times. The goal of welfare is to put people back to work in order to
become productive, self-sufficient members of society. Although some
reduction in welfare benefits may be inevitable, cost-cutting should not
84 Spencer Abraham, et al., A Manifesto for Immigration, Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1996 at
A18.8 5 [d.
86 President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address, (Feb. 5, 1997) in Wash. Post at
A18.8 7 [d.
8 8 [d.
89 Supra, note 63.
come at the expense of leaving the entire legal immigrant community
utterly disadvantaged. Doing so will only shift the burden to state and
local assistance programs, hospitals, clinics and charities. Instead, the
government should take a more egalitarian approach in reducing welfare
benefits to citizens and non-citizens alike. Furthermore, changes in
welfare benefits should correspond with immigration policies designed to
attract more valuable immigrants, those less likely to warrant public
assistance. "Because they work hard, immigrants create a 'brain gain' for
the U.S .... Today, knowledgeable immigrants from around the world
continue to want to come to our shores. Attracting inspired minds from
around the world is America's greatest strength, not a weakness.
'
"
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